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Abstract. Aumann (1976) has shown that agents who have a
common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors
for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event
E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that
it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E do coincide?
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for this is the existence of a
nonempty ﬁnite event F with the following two properties. First,
it is common knowledge at F that the agents cannot tell whether
or not E. Second, this still holds true at F, when F becomes
common knowledge.
1. Introduction
1.1. Agreeing to disagree and agreeing to agree. Can agents have
common knowledge of their beliefs? In a seminal paper Aumann (1976)
has demonstrated the impossibility of agreeing to disagree: For any
posteriors with a common prior, if the agents’ posteriors for an event
E are diﬀerent (= they disagree), then the agents cannot have common
knowledge (= agreeing), of these posteriors. Thus, the short answer
to our opening question is, agents cannot have common knowledge of
their beliefs when they are diﬀerent.
But can there be other reasons why agents may fail to have com-
mon knowledge of their beliefs, even when these beliefs are the same?
Obviously, agents may fail incidently to know each others posteriors,
and thus, a fortiori they cannot have common knowledge of them, even
if they coincide. Our question here is not concerned with such an in-
cidental lack of common knowledge of the posteriors, but rather with
the impossibility of having such common knowledge in principle. That
is, we examine the impossibility of having such common knowledge
regardless of the beliefs held by the agents.
1We investigate the conditions under which there exist posteriors with
a common prior, such that it is common knowledge that the agents’
posteriors for an event E coincide. Using the terminology of Aumann’s
theorem we ask, when is agreeing to agree about the posteriors of E
possible? We clarify this question by examining several examples.
Example 1. Each of two ﬁrms can be either proﬁtable or loosing.
Thus, there are four possible states of the world (proﬁtable, proﬁtable),
(proﬁtable, loosing), (loosing, proﬁtable) and (loosing, loosing). Each
ﬁrm knows only how well it does.
Consider ﬁrst the event E that both ﬁrms have the same ﬁnancial
situation. That is, E = f(proﬁtable;proﬁtable);(loosing;loosing)g.
There are many posteriors that have a common prior such that the
ﬁrms have common knowledge that the posterior probabilities of E
coincide. For instance, consider a common prior, ¹, with
¹(proﬁtable;proﬁtable) = ¹(loosing;loosing) = p;
and
¹(proﬁtable;loosing) = ¹(loosing;proﬁtable) = q;
where 2p + 2q = 1. Then, in each of the four states both ﬁrms have
the same posterior for E: p=(p + q). Thus, it is common knowledge in
every state that the posteriors for E are the same.
Example 2. In the state space of the previous example, consider
the event E = f(loosing;proﬁtable)g. Note that the only event about
which there is a common knowledge is the whole state space. Therefore,
if for some posteriors it is common knowledge that both posteriors for
E are p, then the posteriors for E must be p in all four states. However,
for any posterior on this space, when ﬁrms 1 is proﬁtable, its posterior
for E is 0. Thus, the only value p can have is 0.
Consider the complement of E, denoted :E. When ﬁrm 2 is loosing,
its posterior for :E is 1. Thus, by the same argument as above, the
only p for which there can be common knowledge that both posteriors
for :E are p, is 1.
As opposed to the event E in Example 1, in this example the possi-
bility of agreeing to agree about the posteriors of E, or :E, is limited
to trivial ones, i.e., 0 or 1.
1.2. A necessary condition for the possibility of agreeing to
agree. The diﬀerence between the events in Examples 1 and 2 suggests
a simple necessary condition for agreeing to agree. In any state at which
the ﬁrm’s posterior for E is nontrivial, the ﬁrm cannot tell whether or
not E. We say in this case that the ﬁrm is ignorant of E. Therefore,
2If there exist posteriors with a common prior for which
it is common knowledge that both posteriors for E are
p for some 0 < p < 1, then it is necessarily common
knowledge that both ﬁrms are ignorant of E.
Now, in the ﬁrst example the ﬁrms are ignorant of E in each state.
Thus, it is common knowledge that they are ignorant of E, and the
necessary condition for agreeing to agree is satisﬁed. In the second
example, in contrast, in all states there is no common knowledge that
the ﬁrms are ignorant of E. Therefore, no matter what nontrivial
posteriors for E the agents may have, the event where their posteriors
coincide cannot be common knowledge.
Surprisingly, this necessary condition is not suﬃcient as demon-
strated by the next example. The analysis of this example hints to
the answer to the question posed in the title of this paper.
Example 3. The proﬁt of each of two ﬁrms can be any integer, positive
or negative. Each ﬁrm is informed only of its proﬁt. Let E be the event
that ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt is higher. That is, E is the set of all states (i;j)
where i < j. In each state no ﬁrm can tell whether or not 2’s proﬁt
is higher. Therefore, it is common knowledge in each state that both
ﬁrms are ignorant of E. It turns out, nevertheless, that no matter what
posteriors with a common prior the ﬁrms have, there can be no common
knowledge that both posteriors for E are p, for some 0 < p < 1.
1.3. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions. Our ﬁrst result provides
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the possibility of agreeing to
agree in terms of the information structure only. Although the no-
tion of agreeing to agree involves posteriors and common priors, our
characterization does not employs any probabilistic notions.
Agreeing to agree on nontrivial posteriors for E is pos-
sible, if and only if there is a nonempty ﬁnite event F
at which it is common knowledge that the agents are
ignorant of E, and moreover, this holds true at F also
after F becomes common knowledge.
Using this characterization we can see why agreeing to agree is im-
possible in Example 3. For this we need to show that there is no
nonempty ﬁnite event F that satisﬁes the required condition. Indeed,
suppose that there exists such an event F. Let im be the maximal proﬁt
of 1 in all the states of F. By the property of F, 1 is still ignorant of E
after being informed of F. In particular, 1 cannot tell that :E is the
case. Therefore, there must exist a point (im;j0) in F which is also in
E. By the deﬁnition of E, im < j0. By the deﬁnition of im, for each
3point (i;j0) 2 F, i · im and hence i < j0. Thus, (i;j0) 2 E. But this
means that when ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt is j0, and it is informed of F, it knows
E. This contradicts the assumption that it is ignorant of E.
Another characterization of the possibility of agreeing to agree is
given in probabilistic terms.
Agreeing to agree about nontrivial posteriors for E is
possible, if and only if it is possible with a common
prior that has a ﬁnite support.
While ﬁrms cannot agree on the probability that one is more prof-
itable than the other, as shown in the previous example, ﬁrms can still
agree on the probability that they are equally proﬁtable. To see this,
consider the following example.
Example 4. In the same state space as in Example 3, deﬁne E to be
the event where both ﬁrms are equally proﬁtable. The conditions for
the possibility of agreeing to agree hold in this case. Indeed, consider
the ﬁnite set F = f(1;1);(1;0);(0;1);(0;0)g. It is common knowledge
at every state, and in particular at every state of F, that the agents are
ignorant of E. Second, when this ﬁnite set becomes common knowl-
edge, the ﬁrms are still ignorant of E, and moreover, their ignorance is
also common knowledge.
Using the set F, it is easy to construct posteriors with a common
prior for which agreeing to agree holds for E. Consider the common
prior ¹, where ¹(1;1) = ¹(1;0) = ¹(0;1) = ¹(0;0) = 1
4. When a
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is either 0 or 1, the posterior for E is a half. Since any
information set of a ﬁrm in which its proﬁt is neither 0 nor 1, has
probability zero according to ¹, one may deﬁne the posteriors in these
elements in an arbitrary fashion. In particular one may deﬁne these
posteriors for E to be 1
2. Deﬁning the posteriors this way makes the
fact that the posteriors for E are 1
2, a common knowledge at each state.
1.4. Positive common priors. In the previous example agreeing to
agree is made possible by a degenerate common prior. It vanishes on all
but two elements in each partition. Our next result gives a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the possibility of agreeing to agree with a
positive common prior. That is, a common prior that assigns a positive
probability to every information set.
For any given event E we deﬁne simple structured, nonempty and
ﬁnite events called loops on E (see Deﬁnition 4 and Figure 1). One
of the conditions that deﬁne a loop implies that when a loop on E
becomes common knowledge, it is common knowledge at the loop that
the agents are ignorant of E. This property links the notion of loops
to the condition in our main result.
4When the information set of an agent intersects a loop we say that
this agent does not exclude loops. Our third result states that
Agreeing to agree is possible with a common prior which
is positive on all information sets, if and only if it is
common knowledge at some state that the agents do
not exclude loops.
1.5. The role of ﬁniteness. The less obvious part of our character-
izations is the ﬁniteness. It has to do with the way E and :E are
entangled together in the information structure. When there is no ﬁ-
nite F with the required property, it is possible to separate E and :E
by arranging the partitions in a way that resembles the structure of
the events in example 3. When there is such F, the sets E and :E are
“mixed” together like the ones in examples 1 and 4. The separation
is described in Proposition 3. In Proposition 4 it is shown why this
separation implies the nonexistence of posteriors that makes agreeing
to agree possible. This proposition generalizes an argument made in
Samet et al. (2002) for the special case of Example 3, which is also
related to an intriguing puzzle due to Cover (1987).
1.6. Agreement theorems. The literature abounds with generaliza-
tions of Aumann’s agreement theorem. In this theorem the disagree-
ment concerns the posterior of an event. Milgrom and Stokey (1982),
Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983), and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990)
studied agreement theorems where the disagreement concerns the value
or expected value of random variables.
Aumann’s theorem provides a necessary condition for the existence
of a common prior. Feinberg (1995), Morris (1995), and Bonanno and
Nehring (1996) Samet (1998) showed that when disagreement are ex-
tended to random variables, then the impossibility of agreeing to dis-
agree is a necessary condition for the existence of a common prior.
McKelvey and Page (1986) and Nielsen et al. (1990) showed that
when the agents have diﬀerent posteriors, then not only these poste-
riors cannot be common knowledge, but also certain aggregates of the
posteriors cannot be common knowledge.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), Sebenius and Geanakoplos
(1983), Parikh and Krasucki (1990), and Heifetz (1996) studied dynam-
ics of information exchange that lead from disagreement to agreement.
In Bacharach (1985) and Samet (1990) Aumann’s theorem is gener-
alized to non-partition information structure. In Monderer and Samet
(1989) common p-believe, rather than common knowledge, is shown to
imply a bound on the probabilistic disagreement.
5All the above mentioned agreement theorems study the impossibil-
ity of commonly sharing probabilistic disagreements. This paper, in
contrast, studies the impossibility of common knowledge of probabilis-
tic agreements. As it turns out, the impossibility of having common
knowledge of agents’ posterior for an event may be the result not of
the probabilistic disagreement, but rather the structure of the event.
While the starting point of the literature on agreement theorems is the
probabilistic structure juxtaposed with the knowledge structure, here
it is the knowledge structure alone. We look for conditions that char-
acterize the events for which the existence of a probabilistic structure
that makes it possible to have common knowledge of agreements on
the posterior for the events.
1.7. The paper plan. In the next section, we introduce the basics of
the model of knowledge and belief. The main elements of our agreeing
theorems, the ignorance, and the possibility of agreeing to agree are de-
ﬁned in Section 3, and the main results are stated. A counter example
for uncountable information structures is presented in Section 4. Two
open problems are discussed in Section 5, and the proofs are in the last
section.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Information structures. We ﬁx a state space (Ω;B), with a set
of states Ω and a ¾-ﬁeld of events B. An information structure on
the state space, for agents 1 and 2, is a pair (Π1;Π2) of countable
measurable partitions of Ω. For every state ! we denote by Πi(!) the
element in Πi which contains !.
For an event F and agent i we denote by ΠF
i the partition Πi ^
fF;:Fg, which is the join of the partitions Πi and fF;:Fg.1 It de-
scribes the information of the agent when, in addition to the informa-
tion given by Πi, she is also informed whether or not F occurred.
2.2. Knowledge and common knowledge. We say that agent i
knows event E at ! when Πi(!) µ E. Thus, the event that i knows
E is Ki(E) = f! j Πi(!) µ Eg. The event that both agents know E
is K(E) = K1(E) \ K2(E). The event that E is common knowledge
is K1(E) = \1
n=1Kn(E). It is the union of all the elements of the
join Π1 ^ Π2 contained in E. For further discussion of knowledge and
common knowledge see Aumann (1976), Monderer and Samet (1989),
Geanakoplos (1994), Fagin et al. (1995), and Aumann (1999).
1The join of two partitions is their ﬁnest common coarsening.
6Note that the epistemic operators Ki;K, and K1 are deﬁned with
respect to the information structure (Π1;Π2). In the sequel we consider
also the information structure (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ) on the same state space. We
will make it clear when we use the epistemic operators with respect to2
this latter information structure.
The event F belongs to the join ΠF
1 ^ ΠF
2 . Thus, in the information
structure (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ), F = K1(F), and :F = K1(:F). Indeed, this
information structure can be deﬁned as the one obtained from making
F and :F common knowledge.
2.3. Posteriors and priors. A Posterior of agent i, for the informa-
tion structure (Π1;Π2), is a family of probability measures f¹!
i g on
(Ω;B) for i = 1;2 and each !, such that ¹!
i (Πi(!)) = 1 and for each
!0 2 Πi(!), ¹!0
i = ¹!
i . A common prior for the posteriors of the agents
is a probability measure ¹ on (Ω;B) such that ¹!
i (¢) = ¹(¢ j Πi(!))
whenever ¹(Πi(!)) > 0.
3. Agreeing to agree: definitions and the main results
3.1. Agreements. An agreement is an event that the posteriors of the
agents coincide at some given probability. Formally,
Deﬁnition 1. Let E be an event in the state space (Ω;B) with infor-
mation structure (Π1;Π2) and posteriors f¹!
i g. An agreement on E
is an event




2(E) = pg; (1)
for some 0 < p < 1.
Note that this deﬁnition requires that the agreed upon posteriors be
strictly between 0 and 1.
Next we formally deﬁne the possibility that there is common knowl-
edge of an agreement.
Deﬁnition 2. Let E be an event in the state space (Ω;B) with infor-
mation structure (Π1;Π2). Agreeing to agree is possible for E if
there are posteriors with a common prior ¹, and an agreement A on E
for these posteriors, such that ¹(K1(A)) > 0.
Deﬁnition 3. The event that agent i is ignorant of E is
Ii(E) = :Ki(E) \ :Ki(:E):
The event that both agents are ignorant of E is I(E) = I1(E) \ I2(E).
2From here on, w.r.t.
7Thus, I(E) is the event that none of the agents can tell whether or not
E occurred.3
3.2. The main results. Our ﬁrst theorem states that agreeing to
agree is possible for E if and only if there exists a nonempty ﬁnite
event F, at which it is common knowledge that both agents are igno-
rant of E. Moreover, this holds true also after F becomes common
knowledge. Formally and succinctly,
Theorem 1. Agreeing to agree is possible for event E iﬀ there exists
a nonempty ﬁnite event F such that
F µ K
1(I(E)) (2)
w.r.t. both, (Π1;Π2) and (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ).
The fact that at F it is common knowledge that both agents are
ignorant of E is expressed by F µ K1(I(E)), w.r.t. (Π1;Π2). The
fact that it remains common knowledge that both agents are ignorant of
E also F becomes common knowledge is conveyed by F µ K1(I(E)),
w.r.t. (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ). When the information structure is ﬁnite, the condition
for agreeing to agree becomes simpler.
Corollary. If the information structure is ﬁnite, then agreeing to agree
is possible for E, iﬀ
K
1(I(E)) 6= ;: (3)
To see this, note ﬁrst that since F 6= ;, (2) implies K1(I(E)) 6=
;. On the other hand, if (3) holds, deﬁne F = K1(I(E)). F is
obviously nonempty and ﬁnite. Moreover, since F is an element of the
join partition, Π1 ^Π2, it follows that ΠF
i = Πi for i = 1;2. Therefore,
(2) holds w.r.t. both, (Π1;Π2) and (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ).
Notice that the condition for agreeing to agree in Theorem 1 is for-
mulated solely in terms of the information structure. The next theorem
provides a condition in probabilistic terms.
Theorem 2. Agreeing to agree is possible for E iﬀ it is possible with
a common prior that has a ﬁnite support.
3.3. Positive Priors. A common prior determines the posteriors only
on elements of the partition to which it assigns positive probability; on
elements of probability zero the posteriors can be deﬁned arbitrarily.
Of special interest are common priors that determine uniquely the pos-
teriors, that is, common priors that assign a positive probability to
3The negation of the operator Ii is the knowing whether operator, Ji(E) =
Ki(E) [ Ki(:E), the properties of which were studied in Hart et al. (1996).
8all the elements in both partitions. We characterizes next, events for
which agreeing to agree is possible with such a common prior. This
characterization is done in terms of events called loops, which play a
central role also in the proof of Theorem 1.
Deﬁnition 4. A loop on E is an event L which consists of 2n distinct
points !1;!0
1;:::!n;!0
n for some integer n ¸ 1, such that
1. !k 2 E and !0
k 2 :E for any k = 1;:::;n; and
2. !0
k 2 Π1(!k) and !k 2 Π2(!0
























A loop on E with 6 points. The dot shaped states, !1;!2;!3, are
in E, and the diamond shaped states, !0
1;!0
2;!0
3, are in :E.
Figure 1. A loop on E
The following two propositions relate loops to events F that satisfy
(2).
Proposition 1. If F is a nonempty ﬁnite event such that F µ K1(I(E))
w.r.t. (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ), then F contains a loop on E.




In the next theorem we state formally that agreeing to agree is pos-
sible for E with a common prior that assigns positive probability to
each element of each partition, iﬀ it is common knowledge that none
of the players excludes the possibility of loops.
Theorem 3. Agreeing to agree is possible for E with a common prior
that assigns a positive probability to each element of Π1 or Π2, iﬀ
K1(:K1(:ˆ L) \ :K2(:ˆ L)) 6= ;, where ˆ L is the union of all loops on
E.
94. Uncountable information structures
So far we have assumed that the partitions are countable. In order
to study the question of agreeing to agree in models with uncountable
partitions we need ﬁrst to deﬁne in such models posteriors and common
priors.
4.1. Posteriors and common prior for the uncountable case.
Posterior f¹!
i g are deﬁned as in the countable case with additional
measurability requirement: ¹!
i (E) is measurable as a function of !, for
any ﬁxed event E and i = 1;2. Equivalently, for i = 1;2, any ﬁxed
event E and p, f! j ¹!
i (E) ¸ pg is a measurable set.
A probability measure ¹ is a common prior for these posteriors if for






In particular, using the properties of posteriors,





i (E)d¹(!) = ¹
!0
i (E)¹(Πi(!0)):
This implies that if ¹(Πi(!0)) > 0 then ¹!
i (E) = ¹(E j Πi(!)), which
shows that (4) indeed generalizes the deﬁnition of a common prior in
the countable partitions case.4
4.2. Theorem 1 and the uncountable case. The proof that the
condition in Theorem 1 is suﬃcient does not make use of the count-
ability of the information structure, and therefore it holds also for un-
countable information structures. The proof that the condition is nec-
essary relies on the countability assumption. As shown by the following
example this assumption is essential: the condition is not necessary in
the uncountable case.
Example 5. Consider a state space Ω that consists of the union of the
following four disjoint sets Ai, i = 1;:::;4, in R2: A1 = f(x;x + 1) j
¡1 < x < 0g, A2 = f(x;x) j ¡1 < x < 0g, A3 = f(x;x ¡ 1) j 0 < x <
1g and A4 = f(x;'(x)) j 0 < x < 1g, where '(x) = x¡c(mod 1) for a
ﬁxed irrational c in (0;1). The ¾-ﬁeld on Ω is the Borel ¾-ﬁeld on the
sets Ai.
Agent 1 is informed of the ﬁrst coordinate of the state, and agent
2 of the second. Thus, each element of Π1 contains the two points on
























The state space consists of the three diagonals A1;A2;A3 and of
A4. The latter is obtained by a rightward shift of the top-right
diagonal by an irrational number c. Agent 1 is informed of the
ﬁrst coordinate of the state, and agent 2 of the second. The event
E is the union of A1 and A3. There are no loops on E and
nevertheless agreeing to agree is possible with the common prior
which is uniform on the sets Ai.
Figure 2. Theorem 1 fails in the uncountable case
the vertical line that contains the state. Similarly, Π2 contains the two
points on the horizontal line that includes the state.
The posterior ¹!
i for each of the two points in Πi(!) is 1
2. To see
that the measurability condition is satisﬁed consider P : Ω ! R, the
projection of the state space on the ﬁrst coordinate. Note that both
P and P ¡1 map measurable sets to measurable sets. Now, if p 2 (1
2;1]
and E is a measurable set, then f! j ¹!
1(E) ¸ pg = P ¡1¡




P(E \ A3) \ P(E \ A4)
¢
, which is measurable. On
the other hand, if p 2 (0; 1
2], then f! j ¹!







, which is also measurable.
A similar argument shows that the measurability condition holds for
the second agent’s posterior as well.
Let ¹ be the probability measure 1
4
P4
i=1 ¹i, where ¹i is the Lebesgue
measure on Ai. It is easy to see that ¹ is a common prior for f¹!
i g.
Denote, E = A1 [ A3. For i = 1;2 and every !, ¹!
i (E) = 1
2. Thus
agreeing to agree is possible for E. We show that there is no loop for E
and therefore by Proposition 1, Theorem 1 does not hold in this case.
11Suppose that !1 = (a ¡ 1;a) 2 A1 µ E is the ﬁrst point in a loop.
Then !0
1 is necessarily (a ¡ 1;a ¡ 1) 2 A2 µ :E. The next two points
must be !2 = (a;a ¡ 1) 2 A3 and !0
2 = (a;'(a)) 2 A4. And thus
!3 = ('(a) ¡ 1;'(a)) 2 A1. Continuing this way, we obtain that the
second coordinates of the points f!2k+1gk¸0 are f')k(a)gk¸0. Since c
is irrational, all the numbers in the latter sequence are distinct, and
therefore so are all the points in the ﬁrst sequence. A similar argument
shows that each of the sequences f!0
2k+1gk¸0, f!2kgk¸1, and f!0
2kgk¸1
also consist of distinct points. These four sequences are disjoint as they
belong to diﬀerent sets Ai. Thus, the sequence starting with !1 2 A1
is inﬁnite. This also shows that any sequence starting with !1 2 A3 is
also inﬁnite, and therefore there cannot be a loop L on E.
4.3. The pathology in this example. Each element of the join Π1^










k=¡1 µ Π1 and (f!0
k;!k+1g)1
k=¡1 µ Π2. This
sequence is constructed in both directions in the same way as the se-
quence above. On such a sequence, if considered a subspace, there is
no common prior. Indeed, a common prior º should satisfy for each
k, º(!k) = º(!0
k) and also º(!0
k) = º(!k+1). Thus, all the states must
have the same probability, which is impossible.
The pathology in this example concerns the question of the existence
of a common prior for given posteriors. On one hand, there exists a
common prior since the measure ¹ satisﬁes (4). On the other hand, for
any element of the join Π1^Π2 there is no common prior. It seems that
the subspace relevant to the agents at a given state is the event of the
join containing this state. This is the smallest event that is commonly
known by the agents at this state. In our space, at any state there is
no common prior on the relevant subspace containing it.
This example raises conceptual diﬃculties concerning the notion of a
common prior in the case of uncountable information structures. The
problem was ﬁrst observed (in a diﬀerent state space) and discussed in
Simon (1998).
5. Open problems
5.1. Uncountable information structures. The necessity of the
condition in Theorem 1 is proved by negation. We show that if agreeing
to agree holds for E and the condition fails, then the prior probability
of each element of Π1 is zero. This constitutes a contradiction because
the partition is countable. Here we used the countability of only one
12of the partitions, but as we explain next, the proof requires that both
are countable.
Propositions 3 and 4 are the two main parts of the proof that the
condition in Theorem 1 is necessary. In the proof of the ﬁrst one we
deﬁne a binary relationship on Π1. Using this relation we coarsen
both partitions by grouping together the elements of the partitions.
The second proposition uses this grouping to show that elements of Π1
that do not intersect a loop must be assigned zero probability by the
common prior.
The grouping of the elements of the partitions in the proof of Propo-
sitions 3 does not require countable partitions. However, the count-
ability of the partitions is used to establish that the grouped elements
are measurable sets. Although the statement of Proposition 4 refers
solely to elements in Π1, the proof makes use also of the measurability
of events resulted from the grouping procedure over Π2. These events
are measurable due to countability. Therefore, our proofs hinges on
the countability of both partitions.
The countability assumption in Theorem 1 is essential, because, as
has been shown in the previous section, the condition in the theorem is
not necessary in the uncountable case. It has been noted, though, that
the common prior which enables the agreeing to agree in the previous
section is pathological in the sense that it fails to induce common priors
on the elements of the join of the partitions. This suggests the following
problem.
Open problem 1. Consider a state space with an uncountable infor-
mation structure. Assume that there is a common prior which induces
a common prior on each non-null element of the join of the partitions.5
Does this imply that agreeing to disagree is possible if and only if the
condition in Theorem 1 is satisﬁed?
5.2. More than two agents. All our results were formulated and
proved for models with two agents. Generalizing the notion of a loop
to many agents may enable a generalization of the suﬃciency part of
Theorem 1 to more than two agents. However, the proof of the necessity
part strongly depends on having two agents.
The binary relationship employed in the proof of Proposition 3, as
well as the grouping of the elements of the partitions, are deﬁned only
for two agents. We know of no way to generalize it to more than two
agents.
5This is the case, for instance, when the whole space is the only element of the
join.
13Open problem 2. Find a necessary and suﬃcient condition in terms
of the information structure for the possibility of agreeing to agree in
models with more than two agents.
6. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let F be a nonempty event that satisﬁes
(2) w.r.t. the information structure (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ). For each ! 2 F and
i = 1;2, we have ΠF
i (!) µ F µ K1(I(E)) µ I(E) (where K1 and
I are considered as operators w.r.t. (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 )). Hence, ΠF
i (!) \ E 6=
; and ΠF
i (!) \ :E 6= ;, i = 1;2. Therefore, there is a sequence6
!1;!0
1;:::!k;!0
k ::: in F such that !k 2 E, !0





k), for every k ¸ 1. Since for each ! 2 F and i = 1;2,
ΠF
i (!) = Πi(!) \ F, it follows that !0
k 2 Π1(!k) and !k+1 2 Π2(!0
k),
for every k ¸ 1.
Note that since !k 2 E and !0
k 2 :E, !k 6= !0
k. Thus, as F is ﬁnite
the sequence must contain a subsequence !k+1;!0
k+1;:::!k+n;!0
k+n of
2n distinct points, for n ¸ 1, such that !k+n+1 = !k+1. This sequence
is a loop on E.






By the ﬁrst condition of Deﬁnition 4, L µ I(E). By the second condi-














is included in ΠF
2 . There-
fore, L µ Π1 ^ Π2. Thus, L µ K1(I(E)) w.r.t. (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ).
The proof of Theorem 1 requires the following two propositions.
Proposition 3. Let P0 2 Π1. Suppose that for every loop L on E,
L \ P0 = ;. Then, there is a coarsening of Π1, fPE;P:E;P0g, and a
coarsening of Π2, fQE;Q:Eg, such that 7
(PE [ P0) \ QE µ E (5)
and
(P:E [ P0) \ Q:E µ :E (6)
Proof. In this proof P and Q denote generic elements of Π1 and Π2,
respectively. We deﬁne a binary relation ½ on Π1: P ½P 0 if for some Q,
6The sequence may be constructed inductively.
7We allow each of the sets PE;P:E;QE;Q:E to be empty.
14P \ Q \ E 6= ; and P 0 \ Q \ :E 6= ;. We denote by Â the transitive
closure8 of ½.
Obviously, Â is transitive. We show that P0 6Â P0. Suppose to the
contrary that P0 Â P0. Then there is a sequence P0;:::;Pn, such that
P0 = Pn ½¢¢¢½P1 ½P0: (7)
Moreover, by taking the shortest sequence of this kind, we can assume
that P1;:::;Pn are distinct. By (7), there are Q0;:::;Qn¡1 in Π2, such
that for k = 1;:::;n, Pk \ Qk¡1 \ E 6= ; and Pk¡1 \ Qk¡1 \ :E 6= ;.
For each k = 1;:::;n choose !k 2 Pk \ Qk¡1 \ E and !0
k 2 Qk \
Pk \ :E, where Qn = Q0. All 2n points are distinct. Indeed, !k 6= !0
k
because !k 2 E and !0
k 2 :E. Moreover, since f!k;!0
kg µ Pk and
P1;:::;Pn are all distinct, each pair f!k;!0
kg belongs to a diﬀerent
element of Π1. Thus, the points !1;!0
1;:::;!n;!0
n form a loop on E
which intersects P0 at !n. This contradicts the assumption, and we





















The elements of Π1 are horizontal, those of Π2 are vertical.
Figure 3. An illustration for Proposition 3
Deﬁne PE to be the union of all elements P that satisfy P Â P0. Since
P0 6Â P0 it follows that P0\PE = ;. The set P:E is the complementary
set of PE [P0. An element Q is a subset of Q:E iﬀ there exists P, such
8That is, P Â P0 iﬀ there are P1;:::;Pn in Π1, with n ¸ 2, such that P1 = P,
Pn = P0 and for j = 1;:::n ¡ 1, Pj ½Pj+1.
15that P µ PE [P0 and P \Q\:E 6= ;. The set QE is the complement
of Q:E.
By the deﬁnition of QE, for each Q µ QE and P µ PE [ P0, P \
Q \ :E = ; which proves (5). To prove (6), suppose to the contrary
that for some P µ P:E [ P0 and Q µ Q:E, P \ Q \ E 6= ;. By the
deﬁnition of Q:E there is P 0 µ PE [ P0 such that P 0 \ Q \ :E 6= ;.
Thus, P Â P 0.
Now, if P 0 = P0, then P Â P0. Else, P 0 µ PE, in which case
P Â P 0 Â P0. Thus, in either case P Â P0 which implies that P µ PE.
This contradicts the assumption that P µ P:E [ P0 and the proof of
(6) is also complete.
Proposition 4. Let E be an event, f¹!
i g be posteriors with a common
prior ¹, and A be the agreement f! j ¹!
1(E) = ¹!
2(E) = pg, for some
0 < p < 1. If P0 2 Π1, P0 µ K1(A) and P0 \ L = ; for all loops L on
E, then ¹(P0) = 0.
Proof. In case ¹(K1(A)) = 0, the proof is complete since P0 µ
K1(A). Otherwise, deﬁne º(¢) = ¹(¢ j K1(A)). Note that º is also
a common prior for the posteriors9 f¹!
i g. Moreover, if º(Πi(!)) > 0,
then ¹!
i (E) = p.
By Proposition 3 there are partitions fPE;P:E;P0g and fQE;Q:Eg
that satisfy (5) and (6). The events PE and Q:E are unions of elements
of Π1 and Π2 respectively, and since the partitions are countable, these









= (1 ¡ p)º(PE). Thus, (recall,
1 ¡ p > 0)





By a similar argument,
º(E \ Q:E) = (p=(1 ¡ p))º(:E \ Q:E): (9)
By (6) the relation between the events on the left sides of (8) and (9)
is E \ Q:E µ E \ PE. Hence, by comparing the right sides of (8) and





¸ º(:E \ Q:E):
9This is so since K1(A) is in the join of the partitions. Therefore, º(¢) induces
over K1(A) the same posteriors as ¹, while on the complement of K1(A), the
posteriors can be deﬁned so as to coincide with f¹!
i g.
16By (5) the event in the left side is a subset of the event in the right
side. Thus their diﬀerence must have probability 0. This diﬀerence is
(:E \ Q:E) n (:E \ PE) = :E \ (Q:E n PE)
= :E \ (Q:E \ (P:E [ P0))
= Q:E \ (P:E [ P0)
where the last equality holds By (6).
We conclude that º(Q:E\(P:E[P0)) = 0 and in particular º(Q:E\
P0) = 0. By (5), Q:E \ P0 µ :E. Hence, Q:E \ P0 = :E \ P0. Thus,
º(:E\P0) = 0 and therefore ¹(:E\P0) = 0. However, by assumption
P0 µ K1(A), and therefore, for every ! 2 P0, ¹!
1(:E) = 1 ¡ p > 0.
This is possible only when ¹(P0) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that a nonempty ﬁnite F is a subset
of K1(I(E)) w.r.t. both, (Π1;Π2) and (ΠF
1 ;ΠF
2 ). Thus, K1(I(E))
w.r.t. (Π1;Π2) is nonempty.
¿From now on (in this proof), the operators K1 and I are used w.r.t.
(Π1;Π2). We construct posteriors f¹!









2g. This inclusion implies K1(I(E)) µ K1(A), which shows
that ¹(K1(A)) > 0 and thereby establishing the fact that agreeing to
agree is possible for E.
By Propositions 1 and 2, there exists a loop L = f!1;!0
1;:::!n;!0
ng
on E such that L µ K1(I(E)). Deﬁne a common prior ¹ such that
¹(!k) = ¹(!0
k) = 1
2n for k = 1;:::;n. Consider P 2 Π1 such that
P µ K1(I(E)).
Suppose that P \ L 6= ;. If !k 2 P, then also !0
k 2 P. Since all the
points in L are distinct, it follows that P contains the same number of
points in E \ F and in :E \ F. Thus for ! 2 P, ¹!
1(E) = 1
2.
If P \ L = ;, then ¹(P) = 0 and therefore the posteriors on P can
be deﬁned arbitrarily. Since P µ K1(I(E)) it follows that P µ I(E)
and therefore P \ E 6= ; and P \ :E 6= ;. We deﬁne the posterior ¹!
1




A similar argument holds for elements Q 2 Π2. This shows that
K1(I(E)) µ A, as required.
The prove of the converse direction makes use of Propositions 3 and
4. Suppose that agreeing to agree is possible for E for posteriors with
a common prior ¹, and the agreement A (recall (1)). It means that
¹(K
1(A)) > 0: (10)




By (10) and (11) K1(I(E)) is not empty.
Since K1(I(E)) is a union of elements of the join Π1^Π2, it follows
that for a loop L,
if L \ K
1(I(E)) 6= ; then L µ K
1(I(E)): (12)
Assume that there exists a loop L on E such that L µ K1(I(E)).
By Proposition 2, F = L is a nonempty ﬁnite set that satisﬁes (2),
and the proof is complete. Otherwise, for every loop L on E, L *
K1(I(E)), which implies by (12) that L \ K1(I(E)) = ;. Thus, by
(11), L \ K1(A) = ;. Therefore, by Proposition 4, for each P0 2 Π1
such that P0 µ K1(A), ¹(P0) = 0. Since the partitions are countable,
this implies that ¹(K1(A)) = 0, which contradicts (10).
Proof of Theorem 2. If agreeing to agree is possible for E then the
condition of Theorem 1 holds. As was shown in the ﬁrst part of its
proof, this condition implies that agreeing to agree is made possible by
a common prior supported on a loop, which is a ﬁnite event.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume ﬁrst that the event
ˆ Ω = K
1¡
:K1(:ˆ L) \ :K2(:ˆ L)
¢
is not empty. Then, for each P 2 Πi, i = 1;2, if P µ ˆ Ω then P µ
:K1(:ˆ L) \ :K2(:ˆ L) and thus P \ ˆ L 6= ;.
Since ˆ Ω is a union of elements of the join of Π1 ^ Π2, it follows that
for a loop L, if L \ ˆ Ω 6= ;, then L µ ˆ Ω. Let fL1;L2;:::g be the set
of all the loops contained in ˆ Ω. For each n let ¹n be a probability
distribution on Ln such that for each ! 2 Ln ¹n(!) = 1=(2jLnj).10 Let
¹ =
P






Since for each P 2 Πi which is a subset of ˆ Ω, P \ˆ L 6= ; it follows that
¹(P) > 0. In addition, ¹ vanishes on the complement of ˆ Ω. Let ¹0 be
any measure on Ω which vanishes on ˆ Ω and is positive on the elements
of Π1 and Π2 which are not subsets of ˆ Ω. Deﬁne º = ¹=2+¹0=2. Then
º is positive on Π1 and Π2. Let fº!
i g be the posteriors deﬁned by º.
Then, ˆ Ω µ K1(A) for A = f! j º!
1 (E) = º!
1 (E) = 1=2g and º(ˆ Ω) > 0
which shows that agreeing to agree is possible for E with the prior º
that assigns a positive probability to every element of either partition.
10Note that this is the same probability as the one used in Theorem 1’s proof.
18As for the converse direction, assume that there are posteriors f¹!
i g
with a common prior ¹ which is positive on every element of Π1 or
Π2. Furthermore, assume that A is an event of the sort f! j ¹!
1(E) =
¹!
2(E) = pg; for some 0 < p < 1 that satisﬁes ¹(K1(A)) > 0. It
is suﬃcient to show that K1(A) µ K1(:K1(:ˆ L) \ :K2(:ˆ L)). For
this it suﬃces to show that for i = 1;2 and any P 2 Πi such that
P µ K1(A), P \ ˆ L 6= ;. Indeed, if to the contrary, P \ ˆ L = ; for such
P, then by Proposition 4, ¹(P) = 0. This contradicts the positivity of
¹ on every element of either partition.
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